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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--Fourth Amendment Searches
and Seizures - Plain View Doctrine - Texas v. Brown, 103
S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plurality).
In Texas v. Brown,' a plurality decision announced April
19, 1983, Justice Rehnquist "clarified" the fourth amendment's plain view exception. 2 An opinion of the Texas
1. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). The Chief Justice and Justices White and O'Connor
joined in Justice Rehnquist's "announcement of the 'judgment of the Court."' Id. at
1537. Justice White also filed a short concurrence. Id. at 1544. Justices Powell and
Blackmun concurred, as did Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall. Id. at 1544,
1545.
The hairline distinctions separating this Court on this issue raise serious questions
about the value and viability of plurality opinions. See, e.g., Note, The Precedential
Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 756, 774-75 (1980)
(discussing Coolidge "inadvertence" requirement). Such distinctions also concern
and frustrate fourth amendment scholars, to say nothing of defense counsel and
prosecutors:
[Cops] always call me up at 3:00 in the morning and say they want me to give
them a precise answer to the Fourth Amendment, and I can't do it. It's so
encrusted with constitutional subtleties and the crafting of legal technicians
that we've totally confused not only the lawyers and judges but also the police
officers who are supposed to be constitutional lawyers in the street and make
15-second decisions about what the Constitution means.
Ronald R. Carpenter, Whitman County Prosecutor, in oral argument for Washington
v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), quotedin 30 CRIM. L. REP. 4100 (1981). Additionally,
as one Justice noted:
[T]he law of search and seizure. . . is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone on how
these cases should be decided. Much of this difficulty comes from the necessity
of applying the general command of the Fourth Amendment to ever-varying
facts; more may stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical
rules so that the constable has a fighting chance not to blunder.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). See Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's comment in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973) that
"this branch of the law is something less than a seamless web." See also Weinreb,
Generalitiesof the Fourth 4mendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 49 (1974).
This divisiveness becomes most particularly noxious where an opinion seeks to
refine a previous plurality opinion. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). However, critical commentary on this Court's
fractious "decision-making" is beyond the scope of this Note. For further discussion,
see Justices Expand Meaning of "PlainView,' NAT'L L.J., May 2, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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Court of Criminal Appeals3 had declared that the nature of
The initial interpretations of this amendment were premised upon common-law
property rights. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Thus, fourth
amendment protections were determined by a "trespass and tangibles only" rule. The
amendment concerned itself with and guarded against trespass searches of material
objects only. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
More recently, however, the Court's decisions accepted a test recognizing "a right
to privacy." See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960). "We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers resting on property concepts." Hayden, 387
U.S. at 304.
This recognition of a "right to privacy" took on direct constitutional significance
later that Term. The defendant in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) was
convicted of violating a federal law prohibiting the interstate transmission of gambling information. The FBI had attached an electric monitoring device to the outside
of a telephone booth where the defendant transmitted his gambling information. Ultimately, the defendant was found guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, finding no fourth amendment violation because there had been no
physical entrance to the defendant's area when the device had been attached to the
outside of the booth. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction.
Katz represented a philosophical shift in the Court's approach to governmental
intrusions into citizens' lives. It moved the focus from the location and structure
(components) of the area to a more flexible and somewhat subjective standard that
requires an examination of circumstances in which an individual may justifiably rely
on an expectation of privacy. Id. at 352-53. The Court found no general right to
privacy secured by the fourth amendment; any rights to privacy which may be protected under the fourth amendment are - literally - incidental to its primary focus:
the protection against arbitrary governmental intrusions. The Katz Court made clear
that what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected. However, what one knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not within the fourth amendment's protections. Id. at
351-52. But see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), which describes in detail
the traditional sanctity of one's own dwelling. Accord State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d
203, 214, 252 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1977).
The Katz Court declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." 389 U.S. at 351. The determination must now be whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas or item searched or seized. Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Katz sets forth what is now the accepted test: (1) a person
must exhibit an actual [subjective] expectation of privacy; and (2) that expectation
must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). A majority adopted this test in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979) and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978). For a consideration of its
application to various incidents of search and seizure, see W. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE:

A

TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

(1978 & Supp. 1984).

3. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), cert. granted,457 U.S.
1116 (1981), rev'd and remandedsub nom, Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
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evidence seized within a police officer's "plain view ' 4 must
be "known" to him. This, the Justice said, misconstrues a
criterion from Coolidge v. New Hampshire.5 That plurality
4. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). See infra text
accompanying notes 65-77. The plain view doctrine, properly applied, is not considered within the constitutional definition of "search." It is, instead, a supplement to a
previous valid intrusion upon a recognized "zone of privacy." See, e.g., Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
However, three discrete situations touch upon the plain view doctrine, and different jurisdictions have handled them differently. See, e.g., State v. Rickard, 420 So. 2d
303, 305 (Fla. 1982); People v. Myshock, 116 Mich. App. 72, 321 N.W.2d 849, 850-51
(1982) (citing W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS
§ 8.2(a) (1979 & Supp. 1983)); State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 380 A.2d 728,
730-33 (1977). See also Moylan, The "PlainView Doctrine' Unexpected Childof the
Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1096-1101
(1975). The first is the true "plain view." It occurs only where the officer is already
within the zone of privacy and the object he seeks to seize is also in that zone. An
example is the instance where a police officer is invited into a house (consent) and
during his visit, he spots a marijuana plant on the coffee table in front of him. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Hartford, 459 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. 1983). See also La
Fournier v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 61, 280 N.W.2d 746 (1979) (emergency); State v. Gums,
69 Wis. 2d 513, 230 N.W.2d 813 (1975) (possible consent; "exigent circumstances").
The second occurs when both the officer and the seizable item are outside the zone
of privacy. Here, for example, the officer comes upon the marijuana plant on a sidewalk. That plant is in open view, and in what one knowingly exposes to public view,
one has no reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52. See supra
note 2. Such an "open view" offends no fourth amendment proscriptions. See, e.g.,
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977) (distinguishing seizures
in "open areas" from those on "private premises").
The most vexatious situation for law enforcement occurs where the officer is
outside a zone of privacy, gazing in at what is presumptively seizable. Here, for example, the officer stands on the sidewalk and sees the marijuana plant through a
picture window. Unfortunately for the officer, he still needs a constitutionally valid
reason other thanplain view to intrude upon that zone of privacy. For an interesting
discussion of views from the sidewalk and other avenues available to the public, and
the proper procedure a police officer should follow, see State v. Dickerson, 313
N.W.2d 526, 530-32 (Iowa 1981).
This third situation, unfortunately, is often referred to as "plain view," and the
officer is permitted to seize what he sees. See Scales v. State, 13 Md. App. 546, 284
A.2d 45, 47 n.1 (1971). As an illustration of one state's difficulties with this distinction, see Blackburn v. State, 575 P.2d 638 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) and Clayton v.
State, 555 P.2d 1310 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976). One comment declares "[t]he Clayton
and Blackburn holdings are contradictory; they cannot co-exist." Comment,
Oklahoma's Plain View Rule: Licensing Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 18
TULSA L.J. 674, 690 (1983). However, the author insists on describing one situation as
"pre-intrusive", the other as "post-intrusive" plain view. The only constitutional
"plain view" is - by definition - post-intrusive. Furthermore, he cites Moylan,
supra, at 1100, in which the loose use of language is decried ("The phrase 'plain view'
...continues to possess its chameleon-like quality because of its loose employment
to describe. . . visually similar but legally distinct situations.").
5. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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decreed that the incrimination from such objects must be

"immediately apparent" to those seeking a warrantless
seizure.6 That phrase was declared "an unhappy choice of
words,"' 7 as it "can be taken to imply that an 'unduly high
degree of certainty' as to the incriminatory character of the

evidence is necessary for an application of the 'plain view'

doctrine."8 Not so, said the plurality, only "probable cause
to associate the property with criminal activity" 9 is necessary

for constitutional congruity.
The concurrences in Brown took only a certain niggling
umbrage with the plurality. Mr. Justice White, for example,
noted in a paragraph his continued disagreement with the

Coolidge plurality's suggestion that plain view seizures can
be justified only when the evidence is come upon "inadvertently.' 10 Justices Powell and Blackmun, on the other hand,
would place more emphasis on the "warrant clause."' " They
criticized the Court's opinion as going "well beyond the application of the [plain view] exception."' 12 Lastly, Justices
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall combined in concurrence to
question the efficacy of the Court's judgment, saying that
6. Id. at 466. "Of course, the extension of the original justification [to search] is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to police that they have evidence
... Id. (emphasis added).
before them.
7. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1542.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) as support for the
proposition). See infra notes 78-80, 111-12 & 156-57 and accompanying text.
10. The question of whether the so-called "inadvertence" prong carries the
weight of constitutional command is open to debate. See, e.g., Moylan, supra note 4,
at 1081-84. But see Note, "Plain View" -Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the
Lower Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 489 (1974).
The discussions of whether Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion gives Justice
Stewart's formulation of the plain view doctrine in Coolidge status as "the law of the
land" gives one little wonder why the leading fourth amendment authority calls it "a
quagmire." See LaFave, WarrantlessSearches and the Supreme Court; Further Ventures into the "Quagmire," 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 9 (1972). See also 2 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 2, § 7.5(d), at 602 & n.53 (citing North v. Superior Court. 8 Cal. 3d 301, 502 P.2d
1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972) for its detailed discussion of Coolidge and how the
highest court in the largest state initially handled its effect).
11. 103 S. Ct. at 1544-45 (Powell, J., concurring). See the warrant clause, supra
note 2. The Justices also reiterated that exceptions to the warrant requirement ought
to be "few in number and carefully delineated." 103 S. Ct. at 1544 (quoting United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 1545 (Powell, J., concurring).
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"[t]he plurality's explanation . . . is . . . incomplete."' 13
They would place14 more emphasis on a recent line of
"container" cases.
I.

A.

THE CASE

At the Checkpoint

On a hot summer night in East Fort Worth in June, 1979,
police officer Harold Maples' 5 was routinely checking drivers' licenses on East Allen Street.1 6 Around midnight, he
stopped a brown, four-door 1970 Buick. 17 The driver, Clifford James Brown, was alone. Maples asked for his license.
Brown said nothing, reached into his righthand pants pocket, and then hesitated.'
Officer Maples was alarmed by Brown's actions' 9 and
shone his flashlight into the car. In this illumination, the patrolman saw Brown withdraw his hand from his pants pocket.2° Maples could now see two objects in Brown's hand.2 '
A folded dollar bill was pinched between his thumb and index finger,22 and an opaque, green party balloon, knotted
13. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
14. Id. This concurrence chides the plurality for failing to mention United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); or United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
15. There is some question about Officer Maples' given name. The Brief of the
State of Texas as Petitioner, Texas v. Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983) [hereafter cited as
State's Brief], refers to the patrolman as "Officer Tom Maples." Id. at 2. Conversely,
the Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Texas v.
Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983) [hereafter cited as Government's Brief] calls him "Officer Harold Maples." Id. at 3. That is how the plurality records him for posterity.
103 S. Ct. at 1538. His correct name, for the record, is Harold Tom Maples. See Brief
for the Respondent, Texas v. Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983), at 4.
16. Texas v. Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1538 (1983); State's Brief, supra note 15, at 3;
Government's Brief, supra note 15, at 3.
17. State's Brief, supra note 15, at 3. See also Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196,
199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
18. State's Brief, supra note 15, at 3; Government's Brief, supra note 15, at 3. As
the Government's Brief described it, "[w]hen [Brown] kept his hand in his pocket for
longer than reasonably necessary to retrieve a license, Maples shined a flashlight inside the car to see what [Brown] was doing." Id.
19. Government's Brief, supra note 15, at 3.
20. Texas v. Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1538 (1983).
21. State's Brief, supra note 15, at 3.
22. Id. See also Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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one-half inch from its tip, was caught between the two middle fingers of his right hand. 3
Now suspicious, the officer observed that Brown was
keeping his hand close to his pants pocket. The officer then
saw the balloon drop down alongside Brown's right leg.24
Brown then reached across his dashboard and opened his
glove compartment.25 Maples shifted his position outside
the car in order to watch Brown and to get a better view of
the interior of the glove compartment.26 Maples' actions
were prompted, he later testified, by his previous experience
with narcotics arrests; he was aware that narcotics frequently
were7 packaged in balloons similar to the one near Brown's
2
leg.
Maples noticed that Brown's lighted glove compartment
contained several small plastic vials, quantities of loose
white powder, and an opened bag of party balloons.28 When
Brown finished rummaging through his glove compartment,
Maples that he had no driver's license in
he announced 2 to
9
his possession.
23. State's Brief, supra note 15, at 3. See also Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196,
199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), which provides both direct and cross-examination of
Officer Maples and contains this colloquy:
Q[Dist. Atty]: All right, and he pulled his hand partially out of his pocket.
Was there anything in his hand?
A[Maples]: There were two items. There was a, what I believe was a dollar
bill that was partially folded and there was a small green balloon stuck between his fingers.
Q[Defense Counsel]: Could you describe the size of the balloon for us,
Officer?
A[Maples]: It was a tip end of a - I can't - well, it was a balloon, probably
would be about as large, you know - not filled with anything -just my little
finger and it was just about that much (indicating) of the tip end of a balloon.
Q[Defense Counsel]: When you say that much, could you give. . . an estimate of the size and length that you are talking about?
A[Maples]: Probably mashed down the balloon was maybe, probably less than
an eighth of an inch, but it was probably half an inch long, maybe, from the tip
to where it's tied.
24. State's Brief, supra note 15, at 3.
25. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1983).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Maples told Brown to get out of his car and to stand at its
back end.30 Brown complied.

Maples then reached into the car and picked up the balloon. There seemed to be a powdery substance within the
tied-off portion.3 When shown the balloon, Maples' partner
indicated silently that he "understood" the situation. Brown
was then arrested. 32 The powder in the balloon was subsequently analyzed and determined to be heroin.33
B. In the 213th JudicialDistrict Court
An indictment was returned charging Brown with possession of heroin in violation of state law.3 4 He moved to suppress the heroin as the product of an illegal search and
seizure. The district court denied the motion at an evidentiary hearing. 5 Following that, Brown pled nolo contendere
to the charge. In accord with the terms of a plea bargain, he
received four years imprisonment while preserving his right
to appeal.36
C. At the Texas Court of CriminalAppeals
A three-judge panel of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals heard Brown's appeal.3 7 That court reversed the district court's evidentiary decision, holding that the balloon
should have been suppressed. 8 The panel decided that the
30. Id.
31. Id. Compare Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)
with State's Brief, supra note 15, at 4.
32. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1538 (1983).
33. Id. at 1539. See also Brown, 617 S.W.2d at 198.
34. See 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 429, §§ 4.02(b)(2)(J), .04(a), .04(b)(1) ("Texas
Controlled Substances Act"). Such possession was a second-degree felony at the time
of Brown's arrest. Cf. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, §§ 4.02(b)(2)(K),
.04(a), .04(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
35. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The denial of
the motion to suppress occurred on December 11, 1979 in the 213th Judicial District
Court, Tarrant County, Texas, Judge Cave presiding.
36. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 197 (rex. Crim. App. 1981). It is the denial
of the motion to suppress that is appealable under such a nolo contendere plea bargain. See id at 197-99 (explaining Texas law). For a similar effect under Wisconsin
law, see State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, 96 Wis. 2d 646, 648-49, 292 N.W.2d
807, 809 (1980) and Wis. STAT. § 971.31(10) (1981-82).
37. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (decided March 25,
1981).
38. 103 S. Ct. at 1539.
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"plain view" doctrine did not support Maples' seizure of the
green party balloon.39 The panel declared that in order for
that seizure to be constitutional, and "[flor the plain view
doctrine to apply, not only must the officer legitimately be in
a position to view the object, but it must be immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them." 40
In short, Officer Maples had to know that "incriminatory
evidence was before him when he seized the balloon." 4' Because a party balloon is not "inherently suspicious" or "in
fact contraband," the criterion set forth in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire42 and followed in a series of Texas cases 43 was
not met, and the decision was reversed.
The state's motion for rehearing was denied.44 Texas appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court
granted certiorari.45
39. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). "What we do
question is the sole argument advanced by the State that the green balloon seized was
in 'plain view' incidental to a lawful arrest." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (substance inside a red balloon on a window sill not in plain view)).
42. 403 U.S. 443, 464-76 (1971) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
43. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 579, 601-02 (Tex. Crim. App.. 1979);
DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Duncan v. State, 549
S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ("baggie" itself is not contraband in the
absence of showing that officer saw contraband substance in baggie); Nicholas v.
State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (photographic negatives not inherently
contraband).
44. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). See State's
Brief, supra note 15, at 6. "The en bane court denied the State's motion for rehearing
over a dissent by three of the nine judges." Id. Interestingly, "[i]t was the theory of
the dissenters that, when proper regard was given to the inference that the experienced officer was able to draw when he saw the tied-off balloon, Officer Maples did
have probable cause to believe that the balloon contained narcotics." Id. This would
then justify warrantless seizure of the balloon. See also Brown, 617 S.W.2d at 200
(McCormick, J., dissenting from denial of state's motion for rehearing).
45. 457 U.S. 1116 (1982). For those not familiar with Texas judicature, the final
in-state appeal in a criminal case is to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, not the
Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 5-6 (as amended in 1980)
(Vernon Supp. 1982-83); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.04 (Vernon 1982-83).

Thus, as here, the jurisdiction invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976) is on writ of
certiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
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THE "PLAIN VIEW" DOCTRINE

Pre-Coolidge- 'Wints," "Suggestions,""'Dicta"

The "plain view" doctrine has reached constitutional
credibility after an inauspicious beginning. 46 In fact, its history proves Justice Frankfurter's wry observation on the
"progressive distortions" of the law: "[A] hint becomes a
suggestion, is loosely turned into dictim and finally elevated

to a decision.

'47

At its very first mention, the plain view doctrine was
merely a descriptive phrase on the outer perimeter of the
"search incident to arrest" law.48 In that area, the question
has always been one of scope, of course, where the policeman's right to search incidentally after the arrest ends. In
the period from 1927 through 1969, that scope took wide
swings between an expansive right to search 49 and a severely
limited right. 50 Ultimately, Chime! v. Calfornia5' declared
46. For a more complete doctrinal development, see Moylan, supra note 4, at
1047-88. Charles Moylan is an Associate Judge on the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals; he has written extensively on the fourth amendment and its plain view doctrine. See also Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975); Dixon v.
State, 23 Md. App. 19, 327 A.2d 516 (1975); Everhart v. State, 20 Md. App. 71, 315
A.2d 80 (1974); Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972); Neam v. State,
14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972); C. MOYLAN, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE
SECURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (rev. 2d ed. 1979); Moy-

lan, The Automobile Exception: What it is and What it is not - A Rationale in Search
ofa ClearerLabel, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976).

See also Note, "Plain View" - Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower
Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 489 (1974).
47. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
48. The right to "search incident to a lawful arrest" has been recognized for
years. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (dictum). See also MoyIan, supra note 4, at 1050 and cases cited therein.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search of an office
for an hour and a half and seizure of stamps found buried in desk permitted as incident to arrest for forging and altering stamps); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) (five hour search of four room apartment for two cancelled checks ultimately
found in sealed envelope upheld as incident to arrest for mail fraud); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) ("The authority of officers to search and seize
the things by which the nuisance [intoxicating liquors and articles for their manufacture] was being maintained extended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful
purpose."). See also Note, Scope of Search Incident to Arrest - Not Restricted by
Officer's Seizure ofArticle to be Searched, 13 CUM. L. REv.431, 437-45 (1982).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932) (while condemning the instant search as "exploratory" and "general," the Court distinguished
Marron on the ground that "[t]he ledger and bills [were] in plain view [and] were
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that "[t]here is ample justification . . . for a search of the
arrestee's person and that area 'within his immediate control' - construing that phrase to mean the area within which
he might 52gain possession of a weapon or destructible
'
evidence.
However, once the outside perimeter of "search incident"
is clearly defined, a gray area emerges between that which is

within the arrested person's reach or grasp and the remainthen, a seizure and a
der of the surrounding area. 5Here,
3
things.
different
two
are
search
Justice Frankfurter, in a stinging series of prescient dis-

sents,5 4 indicated that such a dichotomy existed between

"searches" and "seizures," and that the melding of the two
was a result of misread, misapplied, and misused precepicked up by the officers as an incident of the arrest." (emphasis added); Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (193 1) ("Ransacking the desk, safe,
filing cases, and other parts of the office" held "a lawless invasion of the premises and
a general exploratory search in hopes that evidence of crime might be found"; Marron was "essentially different" as items seized there "were visible and accessible and
in the offender's immediate custody."). See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 194 (1927). Cf. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) ("search incident"
warrant exception inapplicable where seizure of evidence was anticipated and agents
could have obtained a warrant).
51. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). It should be noted quickly, to make sense of what follows, that the "search incident" parameters were presaged in Justice Frankfurter's
dissents in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68, 69-70 (1950) ("These words
[referring to fourth amendment]. . . are not to be read as they might be read by a
man who knows English but has no knowledge of the history that gave rise to the
words . . . . Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who
framed them."); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947) (examination of
fourth amendment); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594, 610 (1946) ("casual
and uncritical application of this right. . . led. . . to an unwarranted expansion of
"). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-65 (1969).
this narrow exception ..
52. 395 U.S. at 763.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
Id. at 762-63.
53. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 612 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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dents. 5 In other words, while the fourth amendment clearly
proscribed rummaging and ransacking, that is, "general and
exploratory searches," 56 it did not prohibit the seizure of evidence made obvious in the course of a policeman's lawful
activities. While searching incident to a lawful arrest, then,
a police officer could seize contraband outside that perimeter. He could not search for it; it had to be within his
eyesight. 7
Additional cases expanded this idea of justifiable seizure
without search. The Court in Warden v. Hayden58 held that
"hot pursuit" justified a warrantless entry and concomitant
building search for a fleeing felon and his weapon. Subsequent discovery of incriminatory clothing was justified as
found after a valid intrusion and while in the plain view of
the officers searching for the felon. 59 In Harris v. United
55. Id. See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Frankfurter pointed out:
This progressive distortion is due to an uncritical confusion of (1) the right
to search the person arrested and articles in his immediate physical control and
(2) the right to seize visible instruments or fruits of crime at the scene of the
arrest with (3) an alleged right to search the place of arrest. It is necessary in
this connection to distinguish clearly between prohibited searches and improper seizures. It is unconstitutional to make an improper search even for
articles that are appropriately subject to seizure when found by legal means
.... Thus, the seizure ofitemsproperiysubject to seizure because in open view
at the time of arrest does not carry with it the right to searchforsuch items.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
56. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927).
General searches have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights. It
is plain that the Amendment forbids them. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 624, Mr. Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, said: "In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution under the terms 'unreasonble searches and seizures' it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the controversies on
the subject, both in this country and in England. The practice had obtained in
the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering
them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, which
James Otis pronounced 'the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principle of law, that ever
was found in an English law book,' since they placed 'the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer.'"
Id. (citations omitted). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1967).
57. See supra note 55 and highlighted material.
58. 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (distinction between "mere evidence" and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, and contraband untenable in light of privacy --not property - protections of the fourth amendment.).
59. Id. at 299-300.
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States60 the Court validated the discovery of an inculpatory
draft card as an officer was closing a defendant's car window

in anticipation of precipitation, declaring that "[it has long
been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure ...
Three years later, the seminal case of Coolidge v. New

Hampshire62 was decided. The plain view doctrine became
more or less - an exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement.63
-

60. 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 236.
62. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). This decision and its multiple concurrences and dissents
consume some eighty-five pages of that United States Report. The portion with
which we are dealing is II(C), at 464-73, which contains Stewart's plain view
formulation.
63. As Justice Rebnquist's plurality opinion notes, section II(C) may or may not
be the "law of the land"; as he put it, "it has never been expressly adopted by a
majority of this Court." Texas v. Brown, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 (1983). See supra note
10 and accompanying text as well as cases cited therein. See also Kurpiers, Suspicious
Objects, ProbableCause, andthe Law of Search and Seizure, 21 DRAKE L. REv.252,
263-64 (1972); Landynski, The Supreme Court's Searchfor Fourth Amendment Standards: The ExtraordinaryCase of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 45 CONN. B.J. 330,
330-31 (1972); Rintamaki, Plain View Searching, 60 MIL.L. REv.25, 27 (1971).
However, the vast majority of jurisdictions consider Coolidge or at least its threepart test law. See, e.g., United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1982);
United States v. Wilson, 524 F.2d 595, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gray,
484 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Candella, 469 F.2d 173, 174-75 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220, 222-23 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Shipman v. State, 291 Ala.
484, 282 So. 2d 700 (1973); Adoue v. State, 408 So. 2d 567, 570-71 (Fla. 1981); State v.
Key, 164 Ga. App. 411, 296 S.E.2d 60 (1982); State v. Kapoi, 64 Hawaii 130, 637 P.2d
1105 (1981); People v. Dorris, 110 IlM.App. 3d 660, 442 N.E.2d 951 (1982); State v.
Luloff, 325 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1982); State v. Jackson, 263 La. 849, 269 So. 2d 465
(1972); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 361 Mass. 384, 280 N.E.2d 665 (1972); People v.
Carpenter, 120 Mich. App. 574, 327 N.W.2d 523 (1982); State v. Jones, 213 Neb. 1,
328 N.W.2d 166 (1982); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 222 Pa. Super. 146, 292 A.2d 505
(1972); Armour v. Totty, 486 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. 1972); State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.
2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), which provide a geographical cross-sample of states' treatment of Coolidge.
In Wisconsin, see State v. Prober, 98 Wis. 2d 345, 297 N.W.2d 1 (1980); State v.
Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 846 (1980); La
Fournier v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 61, 280 N.W.2d 746 (1979); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d
587, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978); State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 252 N.W.2d 365
(1977); Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977); State v. Donovan, 91
Wis. 2d 401, 283 N.W.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1979); State v. Kraimer, 91 Wis. 2d 418, 283
N.W.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1979). The courts of this state require:
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Coolidge v. New Hampshire

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,64 a plurality defined the
plain view doctrine as requiring the coalescence of three ele1. a prior justification for intruding upon a constitutionally-protected zone of
privacy;
2. that the evidence be in plain view [which is to say, no search can be undertaken to find it];
3. its discovery must be inadvertent;
4. the item seized, in itself or in itself with facts known to the officer at the
time of the seizure, provides probable cause to believe there is a connection
between the evidence and criminal activity.
State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 210, 252 N.W.2d 365. 369 (1977).
See supra note 43 for a collection of Texas cases on the plain view doctrine.
64. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Suffice to say, summarizing such a lengthy opinion provides a stilted view. A fourteen-year-old girl was murdered in Manchester, New
Hampshire, in January, 1964. Questioning of Edward Coolidge led to an examination of his guns and a lie-detector test. While Coolidge was at that test, a separate
team of police questioned Mrs. Coolidge, and again examined her husband's weaponry. Ultimately, probable cause was accumulated for Coolidge's arrest and for a
search of his car. The Attorney General of New Hampshire - chief prosecutor on
the case - issued warrants under his co-extant power as a justice of the peace [N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 595:1 (repealed 1969)]. Officers then arrested Coolidge, asked
Mrs. Coolidge to leave the house, and impounded the car. It was then vacuumed
three times. At trial, these sweepings were introduced to support the State's contention that the victim had been in Coolidge's car. Additionally, a Mossberg rifle and
microscopic particles from Coolidge's clothing suggested contact with the victim; they
were introduced over motions to suppress. Denial of the motions was appealed and
upheld. State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, -, 208 A.2d 322, 330-31 (1965) (searches
reasonable under Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) "facts and circumstances"
test).
Coolidge was convicted of murder, and appealed. That conviction was upheld.
State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, -, 260 A.2d 547, 554 (1969) ("[a]cting lawfully to
enforce a valid warrant, the police were free to seize evidence other than that specified
by the search warrant.").
However, the United States Supreme Court held:
1. The warrant for the search and seizure of the automobile did not satisfy
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached
magistrate."
2. The basic constitutional rule is that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, areperse unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically
established and well-defined exceptions," and, on the facts of this case, a warrantless search and seizure of the car cannot be justified under these
exceptions.
a. The seizure of the car in the driveway cannot be justified as incidental to
the arrest, which took place inside the house. . ..
b. Under the circumstances present here. . . there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search even had it been made before the car
was taken to the police station, and the special exceptions for automobile
searches in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1927) (citations omitted)
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ments. First, there must be a "prior justification for an intrusion." 65 "The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification - whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to a lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused - and permits the war66
'
rantless seizure.

Second, it must be "immediately apparent" that what is
before the police is, indeed, evidence. 67 "[T]he 'plain view'
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory

search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. "68
Last, the police officer must come upon the evidence "inadvertently." 69 "[T]o extend the scope. . to the seizure of
objectives . . which the police know in advance they will
find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly in the face of
and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (citations omitted), are clearly
inapplicable ....
c. Under certain circumstances the police may without warrant seize evidence in "plain view", though not for that reason alone and only when the
discovery is inadvertent ...
3. No search and seizure were implicated. . . when the police obtained the
guns and clothing from petitioner's wife, and hence they needed no warrant.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443-44 (syllabus).
The plurality consisted of Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Additionally, Chief Justice Burger joined part III; Justice Harlan joined in parts I, II-D,
and III. Justice Black concurred and dissented, as did Justices White and Blackmun,
who joined Justice Black's dissent.
65. 403 U.S. at 466.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1969) (Stewart, J, concurring)). That opinion involved the seizure of adult films. The majority did not reach
any fourth amendment issue. However, Justice Stewart declared:
This is not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came upon
contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of the films could not be determined by mere
inspection. And this is not a case that presents any questions as to the permissible scope of a search made incident to a lawful arrest. For the appellant had
not been arrested when the agents found the films. After finding them, the
agents spent some 50 minutes exhibiting them by means of the appellant's projector in another upstairs room. Only then did the agents return downstairs
and arrest the appellant.
Id. at 571 (footnote omitted).
69. 403 U.S. at 466.
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the basic rule that no amount of probable cause [alone] can
justify a warrantless seizure. 7 °
"Two distinct constitutional protections" underlie the
plain view exception. 71 First, the magistrate's scrutiny required for a warrant seeks to eliminate all searches and
seizures not based on probable cause. "The premise here is
that any intrusion in the way of a search or seizure is an evil,
so that no intrusion. . . is justified without a careful prior
determination of necessity. ' 72 Obviously, this protection is
not disturbed: the initial intrusion is already valid, already
justified. In cases with a warrant, the "magistrate's scrutiny"
has already surveyed and approved the initial action; in
cases without a warrant, a valid constitutional exception is
necessary to validate any would-be plain view seizure.
Second, searches must be as limited in scope as possible.
General explorations are prohibited.73 The seizure of an
item.i plain view does not offend this criterion either. Plain
view, after all, does not extend the search; it merely permits
seizure of what can be seen in the course of that search or
other intrusion. Additionally, when an already validated
search inadvertently presents an opportunity to seize useable
evidence, "it would often be a needless inconvenience, and
sometimes dangerous. . . to require [police] to ignore it un74
til they have obtained a warrant particularly describing it."
Additionally, "plain view alone is never enough to justify
a warrantless seizure of evidence. 75 Where an item sits
within a recognized zone of privacy, the fact that it is within
the policeman's view does not ipso facto make it seizable.
When no "prior valid intrusion" to this zone has occurred,
the officer is never constitutionally justified in seizing the desired object. 76 Such a "pre-intrusive" sighting might provide
70. Id. at 471. Cf. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). See supra
note 50. Compare Stewart's defense of the inadvertence requirement with White's
attack in dissent. 403 U.S. at 510-27.
71. 403 U.S. at 467.
72. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See
supra note 2.
73. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. See supra note 56.
74. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. Under the plain view doctrine, that is. See supra note 4.
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probable cause to get a warrant, however. 77
C. Post-Coolidge: Payton, Bannister, Chrisman
The Supreme Court had only one major "plain view"
case before 1983. It did have, however, two other cases in
which language, if not law, had an implication for the doctrine. In the course of overturning a warrantless, nonconsensual entry to arrest for a "routine felony," the Court in
Payton v. New York 78 indicated that "[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause
to associate the property with criminal activity. ' 79 However,
this revelation occurs amid differentiating a warrantless
seizure in an open area from such a seizure on private premises. The question here was the propriety of an in-home arrest for murder or armed robbery; not the seizure of
evidence, but the seizure of felons. 80
In a case similar to Texas v. Brown,8 ' the Court upheld
the warrantless seizure of evidence from a car. In Colorado
v. Bannister,82 an officer stopped a speeding car. While talking to the driver, he observed chrome lug nuts in the car's
glove compartment and wrenches on the rug. The car's occupants fit the reported description of individuals wanted for
the theft of motor vehicle parts. The officer arrested them
and seized the items. 83 In wording that echoes plain view
rationale, the Court justified the warrantless seizure because
"the reason for the stop was wholly unconnected with the
reason for the subsequent seizure . . . . [I]t would be especially unreasonable to require a detour to a magistrate
77. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468.
78. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
79. Id. at 587.
80. Payton, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The entire question in Payton is a lack of a
"prior justification" for an entry to arrest a felon in his house. There, the police did
not have the constitutionally-necessary "exigent circumstances" which would have
enabled them to go into the suspect's house and seize him. If they had had such a
valid reason, they could have then invoked the plain view doctrine. In Payton, the
Court once again reaffirmed the hoary adage that "a man's house is his castle" - at
least in the absence of exigent circumstances or consent.
81. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plurality opinion).
82. 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam).
83. Id. at 2.
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before the unanticipated evidence could be lawfully
84
seized.1
In its 1982 Term, the Court upheld a warrantless seizure
of drug paraphernalia when a college police officer was
monitoring a recent arrestee's actions. In Washington v.
Chrismans - a campus police officer arrested Carl Overdahl
as he left a college dormitory carrying a half-gallon of gin.
Overdahl appeared to be underage. The officer accompanied Overdahl back to his room in search of the student's
identification card. Neil Chrisman, Overdahl's roommate,
was in the room when they arrived. The officer stationed
8 6
himself in the doorway and watched the roommates.
Chrisman appeared nervous. From the doorway, the officer
noticed seeds and a small seashell pipe lying on a desk. Believing the seeds marijuana, the officer entered, seized the
pipe and seeds, and arrested the pair.8 7 They were charged
with possession of a controlled substance. In the hearings
that followed, the officer testified that he entered with the
sole purpose of seizing the pipe and seeds after he observed
them from the doorway.88 The Chrisman Court held that the
intrusion preceded
the plain view observation and upheld
89
the seizure.
To reach this conclusion under the plain view doctrine,
the Court gave an expanded meaning to "intrusion." The
Court reasoned that from the moment the officer stopped
Overdahl, he had a right to accompany him back into zones
of privacy in order to monitor him. 90 Thus, when Overdahl
84. Id. at 3 n.2. See also supra note 74 & infra note 145.
85. 455 U.S. 1 (1982), rev'g 94 Wash. 2d 711, 619 P.2d 971 (1980).

86. Id. at 3. The case hinged on whether or not accompanying the student back
to his dorm room while he sought identification provided a valid intrusion.
87. Id. at 4. After their arrest, Chrisman and Overdahl voluntarily produced a
box containing marijuana. They also consented to a search, which disclosed more
marijuana and a cache of LSD. Id.
88. Id. at 10 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
89. 455 U.S. at 9.
90. Id. at 7.

We hold, therefore, that it is not "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of
an arrested person, as his judgment dictates, following the arrest. The officer's
need to ensure his own safety - as well as the integrity of the arrest - is
compelling. Such surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of privacy or
personal liberty of an individual who has been arrested.
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).
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went back to retrieve his identification card, he granted to
the officer the right to enter his room. The intrusion occurred, then, when that right was granted. Intrusion became
a matter of legal right, not of exercise or actual physical intrusion.91 The zone of privacy was punctured when
Overdahl entered the room, not when the officer entered to
seize the seeds and the pipe. 92 With this definition of intrusion, the plain view observation came after the intrusion,
and thus it passes constitutional muster. Once defined, this
"intrusion" restates Coolidge's first criterion for the proper
application of the doctrine.93 The Chrisman Court agreed;
evidence must be '94"discovered in a place where the officer
has a right to be."
III.

THE OPINIONS:

TEx4S v. BROWN

A. The Plurality
After reciting the facts mentioned above, Justice Rehnquist attacked the lower court's opinion as far too restrictive
an application of the plain view doctrine. He summarized
the Texas court's opinion in three sections:
At the suppression hearing conducted by the District
Court, a police department chemist testified that he had examined the substance in the balloon seized by Maples and
determined that it was heroin. He also testified that narcotics frequently were packaged in ordinary party balloons.
The Court of Criminal Appeals, discussing the Fourth
Amendment issues, observed that "plain view alone is
91. Id. at 8. "It is of no legal significance whether the officer was in the room, on
the threshold, or in the hallway, since he had a right to be in any of these places as an
incident of a valid arrest." Id. Note that this idea of plain view as an extension of a
search incident to arrest is in line with its history. See supra notes 48-63.
92. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 8-9.
The intrusion ...
occurred when the officer, quite properly, followed
Overdahl into a private area to a point from which he had an unimpeded view
of and access to the area's contents and its occupants. . . . [T]his is a classic
instance of incriminating evidence found in plain view when a police officer,
for unrelated but entirely legitimate reasons, obtains lawful access to an individual's area of privacy. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the seizure
of evidence of criminal conduct found in these circumstances.
Id. (footnote omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 6.
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never enough to justify the warrantless seizure
evidence."

of

It further concluded that "Officer Maples had to know
that 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he
seized the balloon.'"
On the state's petition for rehearing, three judges dissented, stating their view that "[t]he issue turns on whether

an officer, relying on years of practical experience and
knowledge commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize

the balloon in plain view.""
Additionally, the Justice attempted to put the plain view
doctrine in its fourth amendment context. 96 It "provides
95. 103 S. Ct. at 1539-40 (emphasis added) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971), and DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977)). Note that, initially, Brown argued that the decision below rested upon "independent and adequate state grounds." Brief for the Respondent, Texas v. Brown,
103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983), at 10-12, 15-24. This, of course, would deny the Court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). See also Brennan, State Constitutionsandthe Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489,
498-502 (1977). However, Justice Rehnquist found this untenable and declared that
"[tihe opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rests squarely on the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Coolidge v.
" 103 S. Ct.
New Hampshire. . . and on Texas cases interpreting that decision ...
at 1537 n.1 (citations omitted).
On remand, Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), Justice McCormick declared flatly:
[O]ur original decision rested squarely on the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in Coolidge... and Texas cases interpreting that decision, e.g.,
Howard,. . . DeLao,. .. Duncan ... and Nicholas ....
We also answer [Brown's] second inquiry in the negative and decline his
invitation to attach to Article I, section 9 of our Texas Constitution a more
restrictive standard of protection than that provided by the Fourth
Amendment.
[T]his Court has opted to interpret our constitution in harmony with the
Supreme Court's opinions interpreting the Fourth Amendment. We shall continue on this path until such time as we are statutorily or constitutionally mandated to do otherwise.
Id. at 798-99 (citations omitted). Cf.Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981).
96. See 103 S. Ct. at 1539.
Because the "plain view" doctrine generally is invoked in conjunction with
other Fourth Amendment principles, such as those relating to warrants, probable cause, and search incident to arrest, we rehearse briefly these better understood principles of Fourth Amendment law . . . . Our cases hold that
procedure by way of a warrant is preferred, although in a wide range of di-
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grounds for the seizure of an item when an officer's access to
an object has some prior justification under the Fourth
Amendment." 97 It is best understood as "an extension of
whatever the prior justification for an officer's 'access to an
object' may be." 98 He would see it, then, as more an extension of a right to search, and not as an "exception" to the
warrant clause.
For this extension, the Coolidge v. New Hampshire99 plurality listed three requirements. First, "the police officer
must lawfully make an 'initial intrusion' or otherwise properly be in position from which he can view a particular
area."' 0 Second, "the officer must discover incriminating
evidence 'inadvertently,' which is to say, he may not 'know
in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to
seize it,' relying on the plain view doctrine only as pretext."''
The last requirement is that "it must be 'immediately apparent' to the police that the items they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure."'' 0 2 Rehnquist also noted that this formulation has
"never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court"
but that "it should obviously be the point of reference for
further discussion of the issue."' 0 3
Rehnquist found the first two prongs of the test met. The
"routine driver's license checkpoint" provided Officer Maverse situations we have recognized flexible, common-sense exceptions to this
requirement. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951) (exigent circumstances);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 789 (1982) (automobile search); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1982) (search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973) (search at border or "functional equivalent"); Zap v. United States, 328
U.S. 624, 630 (1946) (consent).
Id.
97. 103 S.Ct. at 1540 n.1.
98. Id.at 1541.
99. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
100. 103 S.Ct. at 1540 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-68).
101. 103 S.Ct. at 1540. This so-called "inadvertence prong" continues to receive
the heaviest criticism. Compare Justice White's Coolidge dissent, 403 U.S. at 516-21
with his dissent in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1982) and his concurrence here, 103 S.Ct. at 1544.
102. 103 S.Ct. at 1540.
103. Id. But see supra note 63.
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ples with his valid "initial intrusion."' 1 4 The illuminating
flashlight did not taint it.10 5 His movements also did no constitutional damage.10 6 Secondly, Maples came upon the balloon inadvertently, that is, "the circumstances . . . give no
suggestion that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violations might be uncovered in 'plain
view' .... "107
The ground for reversing the lower court, Justice Rehnquist felt, lay in its construction of the requirement that the
incriminating nature of the items be "immediately apparent." "To the Court of [Criminal] Appeals, this apparently
meant that the officer must be possessed of near certainty as
to the seizable nature of the items." 0 8 It was "very likely an
unhappy choice of words"' 0 9 as "it can be taken to imply
that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incrimatory
character of evidence is necessary . .
o"110
104. 103 S. Ct. at 1541. The validity of routine driver's license checkpoints was
never questioned. See Brief for Respondent, Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983)
at 8-9 & n.2; Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). They have
constitutional clearance in both the United States Supreme Court, Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979), and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Faulkner v. State, 549 S.W.2d 1 (1976).
105. Traditionally, the use of flashlights and similar devices did not intrude upon
the fourth amendment. "[U]se of a search light is comparable to the use of a marine
glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). Accord cases cited at 103 S. Ct. 1541-42 n.5; State v. Sanders, 69 Wis. 2d 242, 256, 230 N.W.2d 845, 852 (1975). See also I W. LAFAVE, supra
note 2, at § 2.2(b) (1978).
106. 103 S. Ct. at 1542.
The general public could peer into the interior of Brown's automobile from
any number of angles; there is no reason Maples should be precluded from
observing as an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy, Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
739-45 (1979) shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which
may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the conduct that enabled Maples to observe the
interior of Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted). See LaFave, Nine Key Decisions ExpandAuthority to Search
andSeize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740 (1983).
107. Id. at 1543.
108. Id. at 1542.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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An officer is not required to know that certain items are
contraband or evidence. Justice Rehnquist quoted Payton v.
New York"' for the rule that "[t]he seizure of property in
plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity."" 2 This probable
cause to seize "merely requires that the facts available...
would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or
useful as evidence of crime; it does not demand any showing
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than
false." ' 1 3 Ultimately, "the evidence . . . collected must be
seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis. . . but as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." 1 4 Thus, the officer in the field is allowed to draw
whether what is before
upon experience when he calculates
5
him is evidence of crime.'
Officer Maples' seizure was proper. His previous arrests
had provided him with the knowledge that narcotics frequently were packaged in balloons. The contents of the
glove compartment served as buttress to Maples' belief that
that might involve posthe driver "was engaged in activities
' "1 6
substances."
illicit
of
session
B. Justice Powell in Concurrence
Justice Powell took exception to the expansive language
the plurality employed. He suggested that the plurality is
thereby denigrating the importance of the warrant clause.
The "language and purpose" of the amendment will not justify this.' " He reiterates that "exceptions" should be "few in
number and carefully delineated."" 8
1 1. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
112. Id. at 587.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 1543 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162

(1925), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
114. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
115. 103 S. Ct. at 1543. Cf. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981).
116. 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
117. Id. at 1544 (Powell, J. concurring).

118. Id. (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318
(1972).
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Additionally, the plurality's comment that the Coolidge
criteria have "never been expressly adopted by a majority of
this Court"11 9 is an unnecessary criticism. They have been,
20
Ultiafter all, "generally accepted for over a decade."'
mately, "[i]ts plurality formulation is dispositive of the question .... ,,121 After acknowledging that the first two prongs
had been met, the Justice evinced the clear belief that probable cause to seize existed, and that in establishing that probable cause, Officer Maples was allowed to use the generally
that a balloon is a common narcotics
known fact
22
container.
Justice Stevens in Concurrence

C

Justice Stevens, on the other hand, felt the plurality decision was "incomplete." The "container" cases should have
been considered. 23 Such a consideration, however, requires
remanding to the trial court for fact-finding. Additionally,
he felt that the plain view doctrine should be focused more
sharply. "Searches" should be cleaved from "seizures." Justice Stevens also wondered whether both the seizure of the
balloon and its subsequent examination would not be open
to challenge. 24 "Separate inquiries are necessary, taking
119. 103 S. Ct. at 1543 (quoting 103 S. Ct. at 1540).
120. 103 S. Ct. at 1545 & n.2.
121. Id. at 1545.
122. Id.
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in a case where
narcotics were carried in tied off balloons similar to the one at issue here.
Other officers had told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known
that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have
recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person .

. .

. We are not advised of any innocent item that is

commonly carried in uninflated, tied off balloons such as the one Officer Maples seized.
Id.
123. Id. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring). "It gives inadequate consideration to
our cases holding that a closed container may not be opened without a warrant, even
when the container is in plain view and the officer has probable cause to believe
contraband is concealed within." Id. For a discussion of "container" cases see Note,
Criminal Procedure - United States v. Ross, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 161 (1982).
124. Id. at 1546.
The Amendment protects two different interests of the citizen - the interest in
retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining personal pri-
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into account the separate interests at stake."' 12- In short,
even if the antecedent seizure were constitutional, the search
of the balloon's contents might not be.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown' 26 is a commendable attempt to clarify a remarkably convoluted passage from a more remarkably convoluted case, Coolidge v.
New Hampshire.'27 The principle for which Brown will
stand - that the "immediately apparent" criterion in Coolidge requires that a police officer seizing evidence in his
plain view have at that time probable cause to associate it
with criminal activity - is a sound one, and is in line with
both the weight of lower court opinions and the enlightened
28
reason of various commentators on the subject.
vacy. A seizure threatens the former, a search, the latter. As a matter of timing, a seizure is usually preceded by a search, but when a container is involved
the converse is often true. Significantly, the two protected interests are not
always present to the same extent; for example, the seizure of a locked suitcase
does not necessarily compromise the secrecy of its contents, and the search of a
stopped vehicle does not necessarily deprive its owner of possession.
Id.
125. Id. at 1547.
126. 103 S.Ct. 1535 (1983).
127. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
128. See, e.g., Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 474, 251 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (1977)
("The plain view doctrine excuses the requirement of a warrant, but it does not permit
the police to effect a seizure without probable cause."). A particularly apt opinion
came from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals:
It is beyond cavil that a prior valid intrusion will not in and of itself justify an
indiscriminate seizure of all items that happen to be visually in plain view, but
that probable cause must exist to believe that the items ultimately seized are,
indeed, contraband or other evidence of crime.
An excellent summary of the cases and authorities on this point is found in
the opinion of Justice James N. Bloodworth for the Supreme Court of Alabama in Shipman v. State, 282 So. 2d 700. In that case, several individuals
were detained by the police because of the complaint of a store owner that they
had been acting toward him essentially in an obstreperous manner. As one of
the individuals was being accosted by the police, he was observed to transfer
an object (clearly not a weapon) from one part of his person into the top of his
boot. The object was seized, under a plain view rationale, and ultimately determined to be heroin. The conviction was reversed because there was no
probable cause to believe that the object seized, although sighted in plain view,
was indeed contraband. The Court held, at 282 So. 2d 704:
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29
Additionally, at least one decision, Warden v. Hayden,
clearly establishes as necessary "a nexus - automatically
provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband - between the item to be seized and criminal behav31
ior."1 30 Other decisions, such as United States v. Cortez,'

"The reason for this rule is apparent. If the rule were otherwise, an officer,
acting on mere groundless suspicion, could seize anything and everything belonging to an individual which happened to be in plain view on the prospect
that on further investigation some of it might prove to have been stolen or to
be contraband. It would open the door to unreasonable confiscation of a person's property while a minute examination of it is made in an effort to find
something criminal. Such a practice would amount to the 'general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges which was condemned in Coolidge ....
"For an item in plain view to be validly seized, the officer must possess
some judgment at the time that the object to be seized is contraband and that
judgment must be grounded upon probable cause."
In United States v. Thomas, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 306, 36 C.M.R. 462 (1966), the
Court of Military Appeals reversed a conviction for possession of a bottle of
narcotics. The authorities had relied upon a plain view seizure ....
"Whether a seizure is reasonable depends upon the existence of probable cause
for that action. There must be facts and circumstances from which the
probability of the item's contraband nature may be inferred - 'the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.'"
C. MOYLAN, supra note 45, at 77-78, (quoting Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 327
A.2d 516, 521-22 (citations omitted)). See also United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1979); People v.
Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1974); People v. Guillebeau, 107
Cal. App. 3d 531, 166 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1980); People v. Miller, 60 Cal. App. 3d 849, 131
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1976) (supporting general rule that nexus between item and criminal
activity provides "seizability"). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 7.5(b)
and cases there collected.
129. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
130. Id. at 307.
131. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
[T]he essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be taken into account. ...
First, the assessment must be based upon all of the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of
operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer
draws inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as
factfinders are permitted to do the same - so are law enforcement officers.
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indicate that the calculation of probable cause necessarily
takes into account the training and experience of the law enforcement officer. Indeed, what is not "immediately apparent" to the untrained eye may yield a plethora of useful
evidence to the legal foot soldier.1 32 Consider, for example,
the various indicia of the drug trade utterly indecipherable
to the "man on the street" and the concomitant difficulties
33
attendant to slowing, if never halting, drug trafficking.
It would seem quite obvious to the reasoned observer
that any retrospective analysis of a seizure must take into
account what the seizing officer learned from his days on the
beat. This would seem especially compelling in cases such
Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of
law enforcement.
Id. at 417-18.
132. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 32 Cal. App. 3d 18, _, 107 Cal. Rptr. 791, 808
(1973), rev'g, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 528 P.2d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1974) (probable cause
established that cellophane-wrapped brick was marijuana when, after police attempted to halt car for traffic violation, there followed a "high speed chase" which
made it "reasonable to conclude that they were trying to escape apprehension for a
serious offense or hide something."); State v. Achter, 512 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. App. 1974)
(parked car drove off at high rate of speed as police car approached; this contributed
to probable cause that odd assortment of items observed in car of known burglar were
from a yet-unreported burglary). See also 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at § 7.5(b) &
n.23 (1978).
133. The pervasive nature of drug trafficking seems a particular concern to this
Court in this Term. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2639 (1983)
("Given the enforcement problems associated with the detection of drug trafficking,"
stopping an airline traveller and allowing a trained dog to sniff his luggage for drugs
is not a "search" within fourth amendment constraints); Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S.
Ct. 2605, 2608 (1983) (no warrant necessary to search arrestee's shoulder bag as "routine administrative procedure at police station incident to booking and jailing suspect"); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983) (no suspicion, no
warrant needed for "document-check" by customs officials on boat in channel leading
to open sea); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (easing Aguilar-Spinelli standards for judging when an informant's tip can support probable cause for a warrant);
Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality decision) (dictum) (temporary detention for dispelling doubts about "drug courier" not unconstitutional where
it "[does] not exceed the limits of an investigative detention."). Groups such as the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) are concerned
that these recent rulings "reflect the Supreme Court's 'clear feeling [that] drugs have
such a negative impact on society that any change in constitutional provisions [favoring the Government] is acceptable.'" Kevin Zeese, NORML's chief counsel, quoted
in Elsasser, 'Search and Seizure' Rules Facing Review, Chicago Tribune, June 26,
1983, § 4 (Perspective) at 1, col. I. Drug Enforcement Administration officials, on the
other hand, find no fault in these recent Court trends. Id. at 5, col. 1.
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as Brown, in which evidence adduced at trial indicated Officer Maples had dealt with narcotics arrests in the near
past, 34 and that he was fully cognizant of the use of balloons
as a means of transporting narcotics and dangerous drugs.135
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the cases upon
which the lower court relied indicate that the question is not
whether the officer knew that the substance before him was
inculpatory. 136 Those Texas cases turn on whether "the officer's testimony indicated he was cognizant of the fact [that
balloons] are used to
transport narcotics and are thus ipso
37
facto contraband." 1
The plurality is also praiseworthy for its indication that
"[p]lain view is . . . better understood . . . not as an independent 'exception' . . . , but simply as an extension of
. . . the prior justification . ... ,138 This clearly follows
Coolidge, and it highlights for the lower courts the idea that
there are criteria to be met before "plain view" will support
40
Simply seeing something will not suffice.
4
That point is often lost. '
a seizure.

39

134. 103 S. Ct. at 1538. See also supra note 27.
135. Id. See also infra note 137.
136. See supra notes 42-43.
137. See Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981):
The use of balloons or similar containers has been shown to be commonly
associated with the distribution, packaging, and transportation of controlled
substances - usually heroin. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 117 Ariz. App.
207, 496 P.2d 633 (Ariz. App. 1972) (balloons); State v. Grady, 548 S.W.2d 601
(Mo. App. 1977) (condoms); State v. James, 169 So. 2d 89 (La. 1964) (finger
stalls). Many jurisdictions have recognized the realities of the drug culture and
hold that ballons are a common package for heroin. . . . Furthermore, balloons have become so well known for their relation to narcotics that they have
been included in the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act (MDPA) and legislatively
adopted. . . . Mid-Atlantic v. Maryland, 500 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1980).
See also Note, Drug ParaphernaliaLaws: Clearing a Legal Haze, 13 CuM. L. REv.
273 (1982) (discussing that legislation, its origin, and its construction).
138. 103 S. Ct. at 1540-41.
139. 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). See supra note 4.
140. See Note, "Plain View" and the "'PlainView Doctrine," 10 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 290, 291 (1982), which discusses Florida's interpretations of the doctrine.
141. Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist later phrases the distinction between an
officer's view of an item and the grounds necessary for its seizure thus: "[it is important to distinguish 'plain view,' as used in Coolidge to justify seizure of an object, from
an officer's mere observation of an item left inplain view." 103 S. Ct. at 1541 n.4. The
clumsy use of language haunts again: if that is an important distinction - and it is why is it buried in footnote 4 and why is the second "plain view" not the commonly
accepted "open view"? Compare "[t]he information obtained as a result of observa-

1984]

PLAIN VIEW

On case result, then, one cannot quibble with the Brown
plurality's opinion. However, several structural flaws diminish its otherwise effective explication of the plain view doctrine. Primary among these is the seemingly cavalier
approach with which it was written. As Mr. Justice Powell
noted, it does range "well beyond the application of the exception."1 42 For example, the discussion "rehears[ing]
briefly [the] better understood principles of Fourth Amendment law" 143 is very broadly written and allows exceptions to
consume the rule. "Our cases hold that procedure by way of
a warrant is preferred, although in a wide range of diverse
situations we have recognized flexible, common sense exceptions to this requirement."' 44 Similarly dismissive language
suggests the "needless inconvenience" for a warrant after
"first-hand perception . . . of evidence."'' 45 As employed
concerns in
now, Justice Stewart's more carefully drawn
14 6
Coolidge are turned against their origins.
Note the plurality's "search incident" precedents. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist builds the contradictory and confusing
case law created in Marron v. United States, 47 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 48 and United States v. Le/kowitz 14 9 into a faulty foundation for his argument.
Unfortunately, each of these cases was in its turn overruled. 50 Chimel v. California' 5 ' has preempted these precedents and set the standard for searches incident to a lawful
arrest. His careless use of common law seems odd. Citation
to those three cases as support for the "rule" that "if, while
lawfully engaged in activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immedition of an object in plain sight may be the basis for probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of illegal activity. .. ." with supra note 4.
142. 103 S. Ct. at 1544 (Powell, J., concurring).
143. 103 S. Ct. at 1539.
144. Id. Cf. 103 S. Ct. at 1544 (Powell, J., discussing the warrant clause and its
central position in fourth amendment litigation).
145. 103 S. Ct. at 1541.
146. Cf. 403 U.S. at 468.
147. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
148. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
149. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
150. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
151. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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ately' 52 seems more odd, in light of those cases' holdings
and history. i - 3 Most peculiarly, the declaration that these
cases "reflect . . . an application of the Fourth Amend-

ment's central requirement of reasonableness to the law governing seizures of property"'154 ignores or eradicates the
warrant clause and its historic position as the fulcrum of the
fourth amendment. 155
Finally, the plurality shows a penchant for creating
"rules" from the meekest of dictum. The most glaring example of this, as mentioned above, is that Payton provides scant
authority for the "rule" Justice Rehnquist extracts from it.
Consider the context from which that "rule" is seized. As
mentioned above, 56 it is written amid a discussion of the
seizure of a felon in his home. Mr. Justice Stevens declares:
It is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law" that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable. Yet is also well settled that
objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public
place may be seized without a warrant. The seizure of
property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and
is presumptively reasonable, assuming there is probable
57
cause to associate the property with criminal activity.'
Here, the distinction between that which is in open view in a
public place and that which is in plain view after a valid
initial intrusion to a zone of privacy has not been made.
Careful reading and understanding of the language indicates
that Justice Rehnquist has misappropriated Payton, and, in
doing so, has weakened the argument for the obvious.
The style of the plurality is telling, as is the case result.
Texas v. Brown should have been disposed of under the
widely-accepted Coolidge criteria for plain view seizures. Its
factual simplicity compels the result reached; probable cause
determined by a trained and experienced officer's eye is
clearly the necessary definition of "immediately apparent."
However, the over-reaching style of the plurality unfortu152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

103 S.Ct. at 1541.
See supra notes 49-51 & 53-56.
103 S.Ct. at 1541.
See 103 S.Ct. at 1544 (Powell, J., concurring).
See supra notes 78-80 & 111-12 and accompanying text.
445 U.S. at 586-87 (emphasis added).
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nately divides the Court when an opinion more tightly written, more reasonably researched would have gained for it
the unanimous Court the judgment received. Unfortunately,
divisiveness is once again the word of the day, and the successful and speedy prosecution of crime - as well as the
privacy and possession protections of those from whom "evidence" is seized - once again suffers for it.
GROVER

D.

MERRITT

